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CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE POLITICS OF RUNNING
FOR CONGRESS: WRIGHT PATMAN AND THE CAl\lPAIGNS
OF 1928, 1938, 1962, AND 1972
by Nancy Beck Young
"The Truth is, politics is the masses controlling. One
is against politics is against the people ruling
and therefore again.\'t our American ~1/ay of life and
our Democratic form of government."
- Wright Patman, 1941
~vho

Historians and political scientists share an interest in the study of
elections, one of the fundamental elements of our democracy_ Historians tend
to focus on the campaigns of a single individual or year, while political
scientists study broader trends within the political process. An analysis of the
problems political scientists study from the context of Wright Patman's career
will provide new insights into the application of political science theory on one
congressman's actual process of going before the voters.
Elected to Congress from the first district in northeast Tcxas in 1928 and
continuously reelected until his death in 1976, Patman's twenty-four campaigns provide an ideal opportunity to examine the changing methods of running for office dming the twentieth century. Patman's career suggests a framework for evaluating the advantages of incumbency as exemplified by the use
of patronage and federal projects, especially regarding the appointment of
postmasters, and its effect on the political process, Patman soon became a
master of what Richard Fenno has since termed "home style" or keeping up
with the needs of his district. Patman's career also provides an opportunity to
explore the permanent campaign as a historical phenomenon. Conservativesusually Democrats but sometimes Republicans - waged an ongoing challenge
to the sitting congressman from the late I 930s through the early 1960s. How
did Patman, noted for his Southern economic liberalism, manage these challenges? Finally, the latter years of Patman's career coincided with the rise of
the Republican Party in the South. What was the response of an incumbent
Democratic congressman to this important change on the pohticallandscape?'
Patman made his initial race for Congress in 1928, He already had com·
piled an eight-year record of service in Northeast Texas, ranging from a seat
in the Texas legislature to election a~ district attorney for the Texarkana region.
Patman challenged a fourteen-year incumbent, Eugene Black, who had lost
touch with his rural constituents. If Black stayed in Congress longer he would
build enough seniority to thwart any challenger. Patman, at the age of thirtyfour, needed to act before his window of opportunity closed. Black had not
amasfo;ed a strong legislative record of accomplishment. Instead he preferred
work behind the scenes. The Great Depression began well before the October
1929 market crash for rural Americans, who had suffered through a depressed
agricultural economy in the 1920s, and the same was true for Black's district.
Patman exploited Black's votes against various agricultural relief measures in
the 1920s, including the McNary-Haugen bill, which proposed a system of
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price supports for American farmers and the sale at cost of agricultural commodities overseas. 2
Patman did not simply rely on the conflicting visions of the political
economy between himself and Black to gain favor with the voters. Instead, the
aggressive young challenger plotted a campaign strategy that mixed modern
techniques with older verities in hopes of overcoming Black's advantages of
incumbency. Patman sought the support of James H. "Cyclone" Davis, a long
time fixture in Texas politics who had been with the Farmers Alliance, the
Populist Party, the Prohibition movement, the Ku Klux Klan, and a member of
Congress from 1915-1917. Davis had challenged Black in 1922, and Patman
supponed the incumbent. In 1928, Patman relied on Davis to perfonn an
advisory role in the preparation of campaign literature and statements. Patman
also used Davis on his campaign staff in the latter months of the contest.
Davis, a crowd pleaser. delivered several speeches for Patman. 3
Opposition research played a key role in Patman's campaign. He communicated with the business, professional, and pohtical leaders who could
give him credible information about Black's record in Congress. A secondary
purpose of these communications involved generating support for his own
candidacy, because Patman already knew much of the infonnation about
which he inquired from the Congressional Record. Patman corresponded with
the state and national chapters of the Anti-Saloon League about the extent of
Black's support of prohibition measures. To make an issue of discriminatory
freight rates, Patman solicited the support of the East Texas Chamber of Commerce. Patman corresponded with members of Congress about Black's legislative service, asked the American Federation of Labor for statistics about
Black's voting record, and also sought information about the entirety of
Black's congressional record from the Congressional Information Bureau.
This pattern of thorough research into the background of his opposition became a Patman trademark. 4
Mass mailings and numerous public appearances characterized Patman's
maiden campaign for Congress, and he followed these strategies throughout the
remainder of his congressional career. He secured various lists, including
teachers, school trustees, and former jury members, for use in selected mailings
throughout the district to gain support for his candidacy. Patman understood that
each "list contains the names of good substantial citizens, and each list carrIes
the names from almost every section of the country." He also made an aggressive
speaking tour in the district, often covering the same territory as his opponent
and delivering over ninety speeches during the course of the campaign. 5
On the stump, Patman made a good appearance. He stood five-feet, leninches tall and had twinkling blue eyes. His hair, thick, dark, and curly, ~howed
early signs of receding. Most important, he enjoyed the luxury of having a
strong and powerful voice that was pleasing to his audience. Foreshadowing
Lyndon B. Johnson's use of the helicopter in 1948, Patman relied on modern
technology to make his canvass of the region. He drove one of the first Model
A's in the area. He realized that "everybody was looking for the new Ford and
I got more people to come see the Ford than to see me." When driving through
the country the candidate would stop and talk to people about his campaign
whenever two or more voters gathered around. Patman left nothing to chance.
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He relied on associates to assIst with such local arrangements as distributing
posters and handbills. To generate the good will of other office seekers,
Patman printed a circular containing important political information about
filing deadlines and convention schedules and then distributed it to them. He
prepared this political calendar for the remainder of his carcer. 6
In the contest in 1928, Patman sold himself as a forthright young
challenger trying to keep the campaign focused on the issues. But at every turn
he attacked some part of Black's record. Both in his opening address and in
subsequent corresponuence with Black, Patman suggested thirty joint debates
over the course of the campaign. Black initially agreed to the challenge. Black
also refuted Patman's assaults on his record in newspaper advertisements and
in the Congressional Record, hut Pannan stood his ground: "You have accused
me of being unfair in my speeches .... If I am unfair, the Congressional Record
is unfair as I am quoting from that record . _. . Since you charge me with
mi~quoting your record, which J deny, I feel thal fairness demands that you
meet me in joinl discussion and let the people be the judge of which of us has
misquoted the record. If you fail to meet me, I shall take your failure as an
admission of the charges and will so contend to the voters of this district."
Patman then made the contents of his correspondence with Black public record.
Black continued to deny Patman's charges. He compared his challenger
with "a man who said that he could prove by the Bible that there is no God and
then he turned to Psalms. Ch. 53, first verse and read: 'There is no God.' His
hearers demanded that he read the rest of it and then he read the whole
sentence and it read: 'The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God.' " Black,
already weary of his challenger's constant attacks, canceled the joint debates
when he learned of Cydone Davis' participation in Paunan's campaign.'
While Patman had hoped the debates would showcase his oratorical skills
and seal his victory. he did not back off Black when the debates were canceled.
Instead Patman adopted a new theme. While criticizing Black's inattention to
legislation, Patman argued that "the door of hope should not be closed in the
face of the young man hood of our country by letting our Congressmen inherit
their offices .... Any Congre&sman who has been in office so long should
either try to go higher or get down and give somebody else a chance." Ironically, the man who eventually served forty-seven years in Congress complained that Black had held office too long.
Patman's record of accomplishment as a state legislator and as a district
attorney, combined with his promise for a more aggressive response to the

agricultural crisis within the region and Black's failure to address these issues,
provided the challenger enough space to win the office. After the votes were
tallled Patman garnered fifty-four percent of the total and carried eight of eleven
counties. Later In his career challengers reminded Patman and the voters of his
remarks about the duration of tenure in office, hoping that they could dispose of
Patman as he had done of Black. Patman then argued the importance of seniority
in dealing with national issues. Furth enn ore. Patman's constant legislative
action, combined with his ability to take care of the needs of his constituents especially in the area of increased federal spending in the region - convened
many critics into supporters. For example, during and after the Second World
War Patman succeeded in locating three ordnance plants and a steel mill in the
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region that by 1962 provided a combined weekly payroll of $703,000. 8
After his first election Patman did not encounter electoral challenges until

J 936. In the intervening years, Patman amassed an enviable record as an
advocate for the economically disadvantaged with appeals for early payment
of the World War I soldiers bonus, aid to small businesses in their struggle
against large retailing units, and small farmers, including tenants and sharecroppers, and built up a sizable amount of ill-will towards his agenda both
within and outside his district.
Beginning with the election in ] 936, Patman confronted what would
become his own version of the permanent campaign which found him constantly
on the watch for challengers. Although his opponent withdrew before the
primary in 1936, Patman did not convince other critics of his congressional
agenda to forego future challenges. One supporter warned Patman that the mood
of the district was shifting away from support for New Deal relief programs:
"People are getting thoroughly disgusted with the relief idea and program, and
this includes the working people. I understand that you can't get a bricklayer in
Texarkana now because they are all working on the relief business:' Throughout
the remainder of his career Patman had to assuage challengers from the right
who had grown weary of his reform efforts. Nevertheless, Patman managed to
strike a healthy balance between Southern liberal advocacy for economic reform
and patronage for his constituent~ and retained a s.olid power ba~e. Part of his
success stemmed from his constant contact with constituents through the
publication of a weekly newsletter and frequent trips back home. 9
On April 7, 1936, David M. Phillips, pastor of the Rose Hill Baptist
Church in Texarkana, announced his candidacy for Congress. Hugh Carney, a
former district judge, told Patman that Phillips' financial backing originated
with "some of your enemies among the big boys up North and East." Carney
believed there was no reason to worry because "the idea all over this congres~;ional district is that if you want anything done in Washington and want it done
right and it is just, then lPatmanl can get it done. And that is the God's tmth.
You are about the only man that we have had up there that has the ability to do
these things and that would do them efficiently." Patman agreed that his main
opposition came from those who had not gotten jobs from the government.
Other rumors placed the source of Phillips' financial backing with the chain
stores, a form of economic organization that Patman often attacked. Commenting on Phillips' outside funding, a.B. Briggs, a local businessman, noted
that the "people see it that if Wright Patman is defeated by big interests sending money into his District it will be years before any other Congressman will
attempt to fight these interests." In the contest. Patman "l wantedl just as large
a majority as possible, which will be considered a~ an endorsement of my
record in the past." 10
Phillips employed much the same strategy in his race against Patman in
1936 as Patman had used against Black in 1928. A Patman supporter noted that
"this fellow Phillips 1S sure working. [Hel is just as busy as can be and is all
over the country in the rural sections doing Patman just a~ Patman did Black.
He is scattering his campaign literature everywhere. He sure has some bad
things that he tells on Patman," which included false assertions that the congressman's social life revolved around alcohol, night clubs, and wild parties.
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In this and suhsequent campaigns, Patman carefully avoided Black's mistakes
by keeping up with the needs of his district. Patman also refused requests for
a division of time. The incumbent, whose popularity with voters caused one
observer to compare his trips to the region with the second coming of Christ,
did not wish to help his challengers draw a crowd.!!
In this and future contests, Patman relied on an informal network of
political advisors and campaign managers drawn from, but not limited to, the
ranks of area postmasters who had the responsibility of keeping up with
political intelligence in their locale and infoffiling the Congressman. Palm an
also asked that one or two friends from each county meet to discuss strategy
for the coming race. Despite passage of the Hatch Act in 1939, which
prohihited partisan political activity on the part of government employees,
Patman still expected and received regular reports from the postmasters.
Patman took an active role in the management of post office affairs throughout
his district: he also kept track of his postmasters' contributions to the Democratic National CommitteeY
Even though Patman's opponent withdrew before the primary in 1936,
the financial and husines~ interests in Dallas and outside of the state opposed
to Patman were not ready to acknowledge the incumbent's grip on the First
Congressional District. Two years later Patman drew opposition from George
P. Blackburn, district judge for Lamar and Fannin counties. The primary
election of 1938 presented Patman with the first of many conservative
Democratic challenges that he would face during the middle of his career,
which included serious primary opponents in 1940, 1944, 1948, 1950, 1952,
1954, and 1956. The election of 1938 also proved a difficult one for New Deal
Democrats throughout the nation. One observer correctly predicted that "the
anti-Roosevelt idea will have ... more effect than anything else at this time."
Elmer Patman warned his cousin of the possible political repercussions of
voting to establish minimum wages and maximum hours. He guessed that
s.hould the measure pass area businesses would close and "a large number of
men will be out of work .... r am sure that the general purposes of the Bill are
good, but r would consider the political effect at this time. It just might be that
you would lose more than you would gain by supporting the measure." Patman
discounted this advice, arguing that the bill would "automatically increase
[Works Progress Administration1 wages."!:;
Patman learned that Blackburn had tried to "stir up trouble among the
WPA employees and applicants" with suggestions that WPA workers in the
First Congressional District received lower than average wages, Patman
requested that the agency see to it that various job applicants be accommodated. Sam Rayburn, a powerful Democratic congressman from nearby
Bonham, Texas, also solicited aid from the WPA for his friend Patman,
"Wright Patman, one of the best Administration supporters here and one of our
ablest fellows, has developed opposition. They are trying to tell that people in
Dallas get higher wages than they do in Lamar, Delta and Hopkins Counties,
and I am simply writing you to say that any way you can be helpful to Wright.
I think would be a real service."!4
Long and Wortham, a law firm located in Paris with investments in chain
stores, encouraged and financed Blackburn's race. Patman knew that Long and
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Wortham represented the Dallas-based Texas Power and Light and the cotton
seed mills, so he was not surprised to learn of their opposition to his reelection.
Yet Blackburn's charges that Patman was not supportive of WPA workers
indicated the challenger's attempts to position himself as endorsing the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. A Patman strategist told the congressman
that Blackburn risked alienating his financial backers: "Blackburn claims to be
with the Administration in certain parts of its program, but the men who are
actively aligned with him are known to oppose the Administration Program
and that would indicatc they are anti-Administration .... Some dircct questions publicly issued would probably put him on the spot with his own hometown citizens, because he would be afraid to antagonize his backers, or his
voting friends."15
Patman asked the administration for help with his campaign because of
the various outside business interests working against him. He believed he
could handle criticisms of his vote for the wage-and-hour bill but asked that
the president write a letter explaining the rationale behind the WPA wage
scale. Patman told Agriculture Secretary Henry A. Wallace that the secretary
of the Texas Cotton Ginners Association had made speeches for Blackburn
that were critical of his actions in Congress and of administration agricultural
policy. "He used lots of sarcasm and ridicule in his speeches, all intended to
try to break down the Government's program. He is also trying to arouse the
farmers against the Administration on account of the wage and hour bill, and
me particularly because I voted for it. Possibly it would be a good idea for you
to get up two or three meetings in this District and get someone to address the
people." The Agricultural Department agreed to such a plan providing that an
organization within Patman's district issue the invitation. '6
The administration did not jump at Patman's request for political endorsement in part out of its policy to stay out of primary election disputes and
in part out of dissatisfaction with Patman's political advocacy of the WWI
soldiers bonus and other policies that were anathema to the Democratic
president. Roosevelt even avoided meeting with Patman when he passed
through Texas. Patman complained to the White House when Blackburn
charged that the administration had snubbed him. "My 'yes, but' Democrat
opponent claims that Mr. Roosevelt ignored me on his trip to Texas and the
administration is really agaim;t me for renomination." The Texarkana Democrat asked his friend Rayburn for help with the administration. Rayburn told
the White House that "J would like to have a word from the president that
would correct or stop this talk. I may say that Patman has been one of the most
loyal supporters that the President has had voting against as few administration
measures as probably any member of Congress. I am not trying to draw the
president into any primary fight but it seems to me that it would be perfectly
all right for the president ... to wire Patman something. Frankly he is going to
be elected overwhelmingly anyhow I think. But we may need him in the future
as we have in the past." The only response Patman received from the White
House was an apology that the president's secretary dellveredY Patman did
not need a word from Roosevelt to demonstrate his mettle to his constituents,
who overwhelmingly returned him to office, but his victory did not quiet
conservative opposition within the husiness community.
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In his perpetual fight with large, outside business concerns, Patman never
relied solely on people in the First Congressional District to suppOli his campaign fundraising. Instead his contlnuing electoral success relied on outslde
contributions from financial concerns that benefited from Patman's presence
in Washington. In 1938 George Burger requested that all independent tire
dealers contribute to Pannan so he would have necessary funds to buy radio
time. In 1940, Paul D. Carroll, a member of the Texas Board of Phannacy from
Texarkana, arranged for traveling salesmen to collect signatures in support of
Patman from merchants while making their rounds. Patman informed other
supporters in the business communlty of this and asked that they do the same.
In 1946. Fred F. Florence, president of the Repuhlic National Bank in Dalla",
wrote Patman to offer his support in the coming campaign. That same year,
John W. Dargavel promised the backing of the National Association of Retail
Druggists. In 1948, Burger encouraged his organization, the National Federation of Small Businesses, to support Patman in his campaign. And in 1962,
Patman received contributions from various savings and loan association
officials throughout Texas. ls
Patman's challengers throughout the 1940s and 1950s emphasized conservative themes in their attempts to unseat him. These decades were the
zenith of intra-party Democratic conservatism in Texas, and Patman, as a
liberal Southern Democrat, had to adapt not only to the cycle of the permanent
campaign but also to an increasingly stronger challenge from the right that
lncluded racial demagoguery, criticisms of federal budgetary decisions, and a
more vislble display of technology in politics. A review of the election returns
for 1940, 1944, 1948, 1950, 1952, 1954, and 1956, indicate that never more
than forty-five percent of the voters in the district responded to the conservative rhetoric. 19
Patman ufoied caution in dealing with the race issue. While he never
directly challenged the prevailing social mores of white Southern society, he
did not publicly defend the ideology of white supremacy. Instead, Patman
sought, with varying degrees of success, the middle ground. In 1940. Patman
declared that African Americans would not be permitted to vote in the
Democratic primary, and continued to endorse this policy until the Supreme
Court overturned the white primary. In 1946, two years after that decision.
Patman fooolicited the votes of his African American constituents. Frank King,
a Texarkana dentist, told Patman that "in a close race the negro is now the
balance of power in your district. You will recall on several occasions I have
pointed au( some hard looking black brother or sister and called them your
constituents - such statement is no longer a joke." Such truths did not remove
the need to appeal to a white constituency paranoid about increased African
American political power. and in 1948, supporters warned Patman that he
should affirm the state's rights doctrine, advice which he readily heeded.
Despite these tactics the opposition criticized Patman for his support of federal
aid to education. "Federal aid ... means that in the schools of the first
congressional district of Texas that eventually there might be, not one school
for whites and one for blacks; hut one school for all." In navigating the choppy
waters of civil rights. Patman believed that Democrats opposed to the party
posltion on civil rights would be no happier with the Republicans but instead
should ":fight the questions out in OUf own Party." By the middle of the 19505,
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Patman used local community activists as intermediaries and quietly strengthened his ties to the black community, a constituency that generally supported
his agenda for a more liberal economic policy. Patman's series of conservative
challengers believed him vulnerable on the question of segregation, and in
1956, Kenneth W. Simmons, mayor of Avinger and chairman of the Northeast
Texas Defense Area Committee, made it a major issue in his race for Congress,
using one-minute television advertisements each night that emphasized the
issue. According to one source, Simmons planned "to beat [Patman] on the
segregation question .... Watman] received 97% of the negro vote last time,
and had refused to take any stand on the segregation issue,""o
Patman was more forthcoming with his defense of the federal government's spending policies. Thus his political opponents frequently relied on
these issues in their campaigns. In 1944, Abe Mays, a former state representative and outspoken critic of the New Dcal, centered his attack on Patman's
distribution of patronage in the district and its relationship to federal budgetary
priorities. He criticized the "henchmen lPatman] has. in all the towns, the
postmasters, the many men that have received fat contracts from the Government because of the war." Mays asked voters "Do you know about the Government wanting to purchalie 800 lots in Texarkana to build homes for war
workers, and the present Congressman appointing one of his own henchmen
as the local czar over the deal? How much money do you suppose they made
off these deals, at yours and my expense? I'll tell you they made plenty, and
don't you let anyone tell you otherwise." Six years later Mays challenged
Patman for a second time, and he argued that there was no difference between
the economic policies of Josep Stalin and Harry S Truman. Early in the 19505
a group called Democrats Opposed to Socialism entered the political arena in
northeast Texas for the pUI1JOse of unseating Patman. One of the group's
organizers claimed "there are three million employees on the government
payroll and a million more receiving handouts. They're going to fight and fight
hard for their paycheck .... Too many of our people have gone money mad.
They haven't time to save the country. But unless they do something and do it
now, our nation will collapse. We can't go on as we are and survive."21
During the 1940s and 1950s new methods of communication and transportation played a greater role in the political arena. For example, the use of
radio and television as a means of reaching the voters accelerated. Even in the
campaign in 1938 radio had played a role in the final weeks of the contest. As
an incumbent, Patman often reacted to the use of new technology rather than
set trends. In 1950 Patman learned that perennial challenger Abe Mays was
"spending ahout $1,000 a week on radio time alone." In 1954, Simmons
copied Lyndon B. Johnson by making a campaign tour of the district by
helicopter. Patman estimated that Simmons spent $50,000 to make the race

against him that year. In the rematch in 1956, Simmons opened his campaign
in the middle of January on television. Patman had discussed with Eugene B.
Gennany, president of Lone Star Steel, the wisdom of using a helicopter much
as Simmons had done in 1954 and planned to do again in 1956. Another Lone
Star Steel official agreed with their decision against such a plan because "your
usc of a 'copter would prevent your making capital of the fact that your
opponent is using such an expensive tool to get votes when he has no visible
means of paying the tab himself. It further would prevent raising the question
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of 'who's paying the bill?' " Nevertheless, Lone Star Steel arranged and paid
for thirty-three commercials during the last fOUf days of the campaign. In
addition, Patman made an hour-long film telling the story of his life and public
service. His county campaign managers also took to the television to discuss
his reelection, and on the day before the election Patman's friends conducted
a television marathon in support of his candidacy. 2~
By 1962 the politics of getting elected to Congress had changed
significantly for Wright Patman. Gone was reliance on district postmasters to
provide written intelligence reports. Any activity in which these old standbys
participated had to occur away from both Republican and Democratic critics
willing to charge Patman's appointees. with Hatch Act violations. By 1962 the
pennancnt campaign. ironically enough because this was the last race in which
Patman faced a serious opponent, had evolved to the point where Patman's
opposition undertook serious political activity over a year before the Democratic primary. A thorough analysis of this race must take into account the
context in which it occurred. Communist hysteria nationally and the increasing
influence of the Republican Party in Texas brought Patman serious opposition
from the right in the Democratic primary and Republicans in the general
election. Thus that year's contest proved significant in the larger context of the
changing political landscape in Texas and the South.
Evidence of strong opposition became apparent in August 1961. Bascom
Perkins reported to Patman that a group of leading citizens in Mt. Pleasant had
organized behind the candidacy of Sam B. Hall, Jr., a Marshall attorney. and
had received direction from conservative political leaders in Dallas. "It is a
crafty, cunning and shrewd approach .... Every religious group of any size in
this town is represented .... This is a type of political approach that I am afraid
that you are not familiar with. You understand that banks now have a great deal
of power over people, and the theory of this type of a political approach is to
make people afraid to oppose them." Perkins also charged that the Southwestern Electric Power Company and Eugene B. Gennany were behind the
efforts to unseat Patman. Perkins recommended that Patman usc radio and
television to appeal to the voters and present an image of strength. During the
fall Abe Mays, who had challenged Patman previously, took to the air waves
for the duration of the campaign in support of Hall and broadcast a daily radio
program critical of the incumbent. l1
Hall used the Constitution as an issue to question Patman's support for an
activist federal government. Hall emphasized the centrality of the original
intent of the Constitution to American society, calling it the "greatest and best
system yet devised for allowing government to fulfill its proper roll." Patman
questioned Hall's knowledge of the Constitution and pointed out the
challenger's past affiliation with the Constitution Party, whose "main idea, if
any, is to abolish the Federal income tax; and the opposition's candidate was
still making speeches as late as November describing the federal income tax
as a communistic plot." Hall promised the introduction of legislation outlawing th~ Communist Party. 24
Patman ignored the G,O.P. challenge until after the May primary. Patman
supporters worried that a strong showing by Jack Cox, the Republican
candidate in the governor's race against John Connally, could help the
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Republican Party locally which had "unlimited time to spend on organization."
One local official explained that the G.O.P. captured a quarter of the vote
because "they had a very fine organization which worked hard, where as we
waited until the last two weeks and then emphasized publicity rather than real
organizational effort. Perhaps the vote was a real tonic, in that it made us aware
of OUT local shortcomings." Patman agreed that a lack of organization by the
Democrats aided Republican totals in November. 25
Patman's elections provide a glimpse of the evolving sophistication of
campaign organization, including the use of scientific polling methods, the use
of the union label, and the use of professional political consultants. By 1962,
Patman relied on his local campaign staff to contact leading supporters in
towns throughout the district to receive the latest political information. Patman
had a well-run campaign headquarters that operated a telephone bank. Staff
members also coordinated an absentee vote drive and a general get-out-thevote effort among likely Patman supporters. Office worker~ supervi~ed the
preparation of mailings to all poll tax holders, a special mailing from the
congressman to union members, and another mailing hom the AFL-CIO
Labor Council to union members. Patman's campaign staff coordinated their
efforts with local labor leaders who took charge of distributing placards,
bumper stickers, and literature in area plants and shopping centers. On election
day the Patman campaign conducted an aggressive get-out-the-vote drive
complete wlth cars to transport the voters. 26
That November Patman for the tirst time met a serious Republican
challenger. James A. Timberlake, a Texarkana businessman and fanner F.B.I,
agent, made the race because of concerns for maintaining the Christian
foundations of American society and cutting the budget deficit. Timberlake
believed it his calling to foster the growth of the Republican Party in Texas. He
thought a two-party system was ncces~ary for the preservation of a democratic
government. Timberlake characterized Patman as a wasteful spender whose
policies jeopardized future generations of Americans. He engaged in a marathon swing through each county in the district trying to create a Republican
network where none had existed before. Timberlake did not win, but he did
represent yet another facet of the conservative challenge to Patman's power
base which ultimately would weaken the ability of liberal Democrats to hold
power in Northeast Texas. 21

During the remainder of the 1960s, Patman encountered no serious
opposition, but, in the 1970s, the octogenarian legislator had three more
campaigns - 1970, 1972, and 1974. These races, when viewed in the larger
context of Patman's political career, were anticlimactic. Even though Patman
found himself in a permanent campaign cycle in the middle of his career, he
had become a fixture in Washington by tending to business at home. Even
local business leaders in his district often supported Patman by the 1940~_
They overlooked the incumbent's liberal voting record because of the many
federal projects he procured for the region. While Patman noted in campaign
after campaign the federal money his seniority accrued for the First Congressional District, he also recognized immediate political benefIts of his own in
the form of support from conservative community leaders, a reward that fellow
liberals such as Maury Maverick, who were defeated early in their careers,
never received. Patman's career demonstrates that campaign gimmicks such as
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the use of modern technology and charges of being in office too long were not
enough to unseat a powerful incumbent. His constituents recognized the value
of his seniority and overlooked cries that he had held the job too long.
As a campaigner Patman successfully employed the techniques of the
challenger 1n 1928 by starting the race early, repeatedly questioning the
incumbent's record while ~Lating his desire Lo avoid character assassination,
and soliciting the support of likely constituencies both within and outside the
district. As an incumbent, Patman did everything possible to prevent defeat by
a challenger. In so doing he used many of the same strategies as conservative
Democrats from the South, thus illustrating that in congressional politics
sometimes greater differences exist between incumbents and challengers than
between liberals and conservatives. He worked hard to keep up his relations
with the district's voters and community and political leaders. The wily Texan
fanned a tight clique among the postmasters and other patronage recipients
who helped him navigate the waters of the permanent campaign he endured
from the political right.
The development of the Republican Party in the First District continued
despite Patman's defeat of Timberlake in 1962. The growing strength of the
G.O.P. in East Texas has made it more difficult for liberals such as Patman to
achieve power. In reviewing Patman's various campaigns between 1928 and
1974, elements of both change and continuity exist. The greatest change is that
of challenger to incumbent, while evidence of continuity predomlnates when
comparing Patman's permanent campaign with more recent elections.
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